The victim, “M.F.P.,” visited Larry Chavis and his wife in July, 1997. They bought some beer. Then Mr. Chavis drove down a remote road, M.F.P. said, “out in the sticks.” Chavis “was shaking the wheel really bad,” and pulled the car over. He asked M.F.P. to get out of the car and to shine a flashlight in the vicinity of a tire for him. Then, according to the state's evidence, Chavis pushed her up against the car, and touched her “all over” her body, under her underwear. She “felt his fingers or his finger go inside” her.

The state charged Chavis with a statutory sexual offense and with attempted statutory rape. At trial, Dr. Margaret Barnes, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified that, about one month after the alleged events, she diagnosed M.F.P. with post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). M.F.P. was “having a lot of flashbacks,” she was “going into the shower and scrubbing herself raw” and she had “difficulty sleeping.”

The state asked Dr. Barnes whether M.F.P. described a recent occurrence that might constitute a PTSD “triggering event.” Dr. Barnes responded: “[M.F.P.] indicated that on July 26 of [1997], she was with the alleged perpetrator. . . . [M.F.P.'s] sister was in the [automobile] . . . and saw [the] whole thing happen.”

The jury convicted Chavis.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider the evidence for “corroborative purposes” only. But then trial court let the testimony go too far:

It was error, however, for the trial court to permit Dr. Barnes to testify that the 26 July 1997 assault by Defendant was the “triggering event” of the PTSD. This testimony directly implicated Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted M.F.P. and was thus not admissible, either as substantive or corroborative evidence.

The Court of Appeals, though, found that the error was not prejudicial, and upheld the conviction. The evidence was insufficient to “support a reasonable possibility” that the jury would have reached a different result if the court had disallowed Dr. Barnes's testimony about the triggering event.

Held: The trial court improperly permitted expert to testify that the defendant's assault was the “triggering event” of the victim's PTSD, because the testimony directly implicated the defendant as the person who sexually assaulted victim, and was thus inadmissible, as either substantive or corroborative evidence. The error, however, was not prejudicial, because the defendant did not demonstrate reasonable possibility that the jury would have concluded differently without the error.

Ruling: Conviction affirmed.