The State of Tennessee indicted Sherman Blackstock for the aggravated rape of a seven-year-old girl. During police questioning he waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the crime. But Blackstock’s IQ of 55 raised doubts about this waiver.
After arresting Blackstock, Detective Tara Pedigo read him his Miranda rights. Pedigo testified that Blackstock seemed to understand before signing the waiver. Blackstock then stated that he touched the girl’s privates with his “ding-a-ling”. Pedigo did not define the terms to the detective, court, or appointed counsel. She acknowledged that Blackstock misspelled his own name on the waiver form.
At trial, the child testified that in August of 1992, Blackstock laid her on a bed, removed her clothing, got on top of her, and penetrated her. She said that Blackstock said he would kill her if she told anyone what happened.
Didn’t Understand He Could Post Bail
Blackstock remained in custody for over two weeks though he had an attorney and the funds to post bail.
Numerous witnesses testified as to Blackstock’s mental limitations. The evidence showed that he is mentally retarded and functions at the level of a six to nine year old child. He has an IQ level of 55, below ninety eight percent of the population. He cannot read or write and requires a conservator to take care of his basic needs.
The trial court found that Blackstock suffered mental impairment but that he made a voluntary waiver. The court stressed that there’s nothing to show that he did not understand what a lawyer was or his right to be represented. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
The Tennessee Supreme Court analyzed the standards for waiving Miranda. The waiver must be made with full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it (State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994)). The mentally retarded are less likely to understand their Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving them. But mental ability is just one factor to be considered in determining if the waiver was knowing and intelligent.
Too Retarded to Waive His Rights
The Supreme Court found in this case that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s determinations. Blackstock operates at the level of a six year old and cannot read or write. An IQ of 55 shows considerable impairment and his failure to attempt to post bail shows failure to understand the legal process. The detective did not explain to Blackstock his rights so that someone with his mental deficiencies could understand.
Furthermore, the trial court’s emphasis that the evidence does not show that he did not understand his rights, effectively reversed the proper standard. The state had the burden to prove that Blackstock did understand his rights and the consequences of waiver. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court.
 | Michael Welner, M.D. Chairman The Forensic Panel |
Welner: Many crimes cannot be successfully prosecuted without the confession, or even the statement to police at interrogation. Were defendants to realize this, they would know well to refuse to speak. But such restraint proves to be too difficult for the offender who feels he can talk his way out of trouble, or the suspect who feels his silence will only encourage investigators to focus on him, among others. Sometimes, however, the confession is not a product of the inner decision-making of the suspect, but an outgrowth of the very complex relationship between the suspect and his interrogator. For this reason, the fascinating challenges confronting the assessment of competency to waive Miranda filter through several confounding layers. First of all, the questioning itself. Coercion seems to be fairly obvious to determine. When statements are recorded, any threats are clear to see. Or are they? An experienced interrogator can convey menace through choice of words, inflection, even body language and mannerisms, in such a way as to evade even the watchful eye of the camera. This is no reason to presume that investigators are coercing defendants just because it seems to have been ill-advised for the defendant to have offered a statement. However, examiners who are assessing confessions need to watch the investigator's positioning vis a vis the defendant, his carriage as it relates to the defendant, the space between them, the defendant's physical response to the interrogator's presence, as well as changes in the defendant's voice that seem to limit themselves to the period of the interview.
Under Higher Power Microscope
Easier to spot is a line of questioning that interjects as it redirects, endeavors to convince the defendant rather than confront, and bargaining that really represents a veiled threat. The power of authorities who question is difficult to estimate, but real. For the examiner exploring competency to waive Miranda, interviewing even an offender who is more mentally capable may prove to be of limited benefit; it's ambitious to assume that a defendant was aware of his feelings during such a momentous time, let alone had the ability to articulate them. Still, when assessing the interrogation, open-ended questions about the suspect's feelings about the experience are recommended. He might respond to such a question with recollections that have nothing to do with the questioner and his demeanor and conduct. Nevertheless, if his responses do invoke the dynamic, then his impressions (unless coached) are more relevant, and should be received with greater legitimacy by the examiner. Deception at interrogation is even more difficult to appraise. Successful interrogators trick as a matter of their trade; even the cultivated personality of an avuncular nice cop you would want to run into on the street is an effected facade. No wonder skepticism surrounds waivers of Miranda by the retarded; how easy it should be to trick a child. Again, a careful scrutiny of the dynamics between interrogator and suspect is in order. When assessing the childlike, an understanding of how that person relates to authority—in situations outside the interrogation—is essential. A retarded suspect is more likely to be suggestible—but will show signs of this quality in other relationships as well. There may be parents, teachers, custodians or guardians, and counselors who have been in setting when they had confronted or questioned that same defendant about other actions. How did he respond then? Under what circumstances did he become more suggestible? How responsive was he to authority? Was he one to take responsibility to please authority? Was he simple to the point of ignoring his best interests?
No Generalizations, No Shortcuts
Competency to stand trial requires some measure of sophistication, especially when the threshold is raised in more serious charges. Still, some retarded defendants may be quite familiar and conversant by virtue of their personal experience. Competency to stand trial, however, does not rely upon emotional dynamics between two people. Therefore, the abilities in one domain cannot reflect on potentials in the other. A person who is competent to stand trial may still relate to authority—or may be approached by a questioner—in such a way that coercion and deception should be considered as prompting the statement to police. Miranda competency can never be presumed by an IQ number, even when augmented by history about functioning in other settings. For all his limitations, for example, Blackstock did actually know to give a plausible and shrewdly self-serving statement. Savant-idiot?
