Jeremy Sagastegui was arrested for allegedly sodomizing a three-year old boy he was babysitting and then killing the child, the boy's mother and her friend. After representing himself at trial in January 1996 he pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated first-degree murder and was sentenced to death. He declined to appeal the death sentence.
A post-conviction psychological assessment in March 1996 suggested that Sagastegui was suffering from a number of personality disorders, but did not question his competence. Sagastegui's mother, Katie Vargas, acting as her son's "next friend," filed a motion in federal court for a stay of execution. The district court ruled she did not have standing.
Holding: In a 2-1 decision, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that Vargas "easily meets the 'best interest' requirement" of a "next friend." While Vargas has not rebutted the presumption of the post-conviction assessment, there is "undeniably meaningful evidence" that he has decompensated since the 1996 hearing and is now not competent. Since the post-conviction hearing, Sagastegui has been prescribed Depakote and Thorazine and may be suffering from dissociative disorder.
Sagastegui's stated wish to die "seems at least partially linked to his psychosis." In presenting this evidence, Vargas has established standing to support the appeals court's jurisdiction to order a stay.
Dissent: "Obviously, Sagastegui is not a normal, healthy individual. A normal, healthy person would not rape, stab and drown a three-year-old, lie in wait for his mother, shoot her dead when she came home, and then shoot her friend." The majority "errs in failing properly to apply controlling precedent because of an implicit presumption that one must either be mentally healthy or altogether non-functioning. Mental illness is not binary, such that either one is entirely healthy, or so insane that he can do nothing.1~
| Robert Ward, J.D. Professor New England School of Law |
Professor Robert Ward comments: Can a person refuse to pursue avenues that might prevent his execution by the state even if he is mentally ill? According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1999), the answer is yes, even though in this case the defendant's execution was postponed.
A "next friend petition," which is permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 2242 of the Habeas Corpus Act, allows a person to assert the rights of an incompetent person on his or her behalf. Essentially, the next friend stands in the shoes of the prisoner. A person attempting to invoke the next friend provision in applying for a writ of habeas corpus must demonstrate two things: (1) the next friend must show that the real party of interest is unable to litigate his own cause because of mental incapacity, lack of access to court or other similar disability; and (2) in an effort to have the court reconsider the question of competency, the next friend will need to demonstrate that there are substantial grounds for believing that the prisoner is incompetent. Frequently this will entail the introduction of information not previously available. In situations where a defendant has some history of mental illness and he indicates an intent to represent himself or aid the state by declining to seek post-conviction relief, the question of competency is raised.
The law is clear that a defendant can represent himself and thus waive the rights to the assistance of counsel and post-conviction relief. The problem for the court is whether the prisoner has the mental capacity to make such a determination. The next friend's duty is to convince the court that the defendant does not have that ability. The next friend faces an uphill struggle. Often, years prior to the filing of a habeas corpus petition, a trial court will have carefully reviewed the question a defendant's competency. Additionally, the defendant may be opposing the intervention by family or friends. Typically, the previous determination of competency will be set aside only when there is substantial showing that the defendant's competency is debatable.
Given the new information about her son (e.g., the administration of Thorazine and Depakote and the possibility that he is suffering from dissociative disorder), Ms. Vargas had satisfied her burden of demonstrating that substantial grounds existed for a finding that Sagastegui may presently be incompetent. Having held that Ms. Vargas raised a substantial question about her son's present competency, the Ninth Circuit granted the application for a stay of execution. Sagastegui was fortunate that through his mother's efforts he would live to fight another day—even though he was in a hurry to meet his Maker.
