An analysis performed by a psychiatrist after a decedent's death is not sufficient to support a finding of undue influence in the making of the decedent's will. A Louisiana appellate court reversed a trial court's finding of undue influence and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Robert Roger Reeves, Jr. had ten children from his first marriage. Shortly after his divorce, Reeves, who was 60 years of age, married 38 year old Jarrett Ganey Young ("Young"). They were married for 11 years before Reeves died. Months before his death, he executed the last in a series of wills, in which he left a large part of his estate to Young, and the rest to nine of his children, excluding one son. The children filed a challenge to the will, alleging that it was made under the undue influence of Young.

At the trial, a forensic psychiatrist called as an expert by the children testified that based on his conversations with a few of Reeves' children, he concluded that Reeves was susceptible to the undue influence of Young because of his need for her love, companionship, and sexual intimacy. The trial court noted that there was little jurisprudence on what behavior constitutes undue influence and decided to invoke the common law factors of susceptibility, opportunity, disposition, and a coveted result. Applying the factors to this case, and relying heavily on the psychiatrist's testimony, the court held that there was clear and convincing evidence that the will demonstrated the volition of Young, not Reeves. As a result, the court nullified the bequests to Young. She appealed.

The appellate court reversed. The court began by recognizing that children and spouses are "natural objects of a testator's bounty," and that the fact that Reeves and Young had been married for 11 years weighed heavily against a finding of undue influence. The court then looked at the statute that created the undue influence challenge to wills in the state and found that it was not designed to apply to spouses. Rather, the policy of the statute was to protect testators from the influence of people who would ordinarily have no expectation of a claim to the estate, but who are able to convince the testator to grant them an inheritance through devious means.

Accordingly, the court found that the common law factors were inapplicable in this case, since a need for love, companionship, and sexual intimacy are inherent in the decision to marry. The court noted that had Young been a paramour instead of a wife, these factors might have supported the trial court's conclusion. The court went on to conclude that the question of whether a wife is manipulating her husband is best decided by the husband himself, not the court.

The court then found that the psychiatrist, who had never spoken to Reeves, may have received a distorted picture of his personality. To support its conclusion, the court pointed to the testimony of Reeves' counselor, attorney, and a business associate, all of whom painted a different picture of Reeves' relationship with Young than that of the children. Thus, the court concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that the challengers of the will had overcome the presumption of capacity on the part of the testator.