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Antisocial Personality Disorder Is a Mental Disease
Yes!
Volume 3, Issue 1 -- Published: Monday, Nov 30, 1998 -- Last Updated: Monday, Mar 11, 2002

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Issues: Criminal Procedure

 by: James Duggan, J.D.
Yes!
An inmate's severe antisocial and borderline personality disorders, coupled with history of violent behavior, substance abuse and suicidal ideation, rose to the level of a "mental disease or defect" and justified committing the respondent indefinitely to the custody of the United States Attorney General pending further treatment.
Henley involved an evidentiary hearing to determine" whether the Respondent (David Troy Henley) presently suffers from a mental disease or defect such that his release form federal prison would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another person."
He had originally been incarcerated after pleading guilty to a bank robbery in 1990. One day into his three-year period of supervised release, Henley overdosed on amphetamines and was subsequently diagnosed with a psychotic disorder and amphetamine-induced delusional disorder. Following discharge from a mental health crisis unit, Henley jumped out of a closed second story window and was thereafter evaluated and diagnosed as suffering from substance abuse disorder, borderline personality disorder and antisocial personality features. Henley thereafter absconded twice from his court ordered Salvation Army Longterm Inpatient Program and was reincarcerated.
In construing 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a), the District Court noted that "psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes a mental illness," the court nonetheless held that Henley's lengthy history of violent episodes, together with the "synergistic effect of his severe antisocial personality disorder and his severe borderline personality disorder" justified detention in this case. While the decision should not be read to suggest that an antisocial personality disorder, without more, justifies detention, it was clear that Henley's release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or severe damage to property, thereby warranting his commitment.
No!
The Missouri Court of Appeals determined that the presence of antisocial personality, without more, is an insufficient basis for continued commitment. The detainee, William Nash, had been originally committed to the Missouri Department of Mental Health following his plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect in the wake of his indictment for burglary. He was then granted a conditional release from the facility during which time he was convicted for delivery of marijuana and sentenced to five years incarceration. Following his release on parole he was returned to a state hospital for again violating a conditional release. Another conditional release was thereafter granted. This time Nash violated his curfew and submitted a positive urine. Upon his return to the state hospital he was charged with sexually assaulting another patient and incarcerated pending a dismissal of the charge, at which time he was again returned to a state hospital.
Nash then filed an application for an unconditional release. At the hearing, three of Nash's treating doctors agreed that Nash did not presently have a mental disease or defect. The court nonetheless denied Nash's application, finding that Nash's antisocial personality disorder, while not a mental disease or defect under Missouri law, rendered it likely that Nash would commit crimes upon being released and he was, therefore, a danger to himself and others.
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Missouri Court of Appeals determined that the evidence adduced during Nash's hearing established that he "does not presently have a mental disease or defect." Citing Supreme Court precedent, the appellate court concluded that "The due process rights of a person are violated if the state holds a person in a psychiatric facility when the person is no longer suffering from a mental disease or defect." An earlier diagnosis of schizophrenia having been refuted by the testifying doctors at Nash's hearing, a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, alone, fell short of representing the mental disease.

WHAT HENLEY & NASH MEAN

Antisocial personality itself is not a mental disease, but antisocial personality with violence and other sexual or personality disorders may be.



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