In Joseph Weeks' mind, his problems all started in 1987, after he was abducted by aliens. Since then, he tells anyone who will listen about these aliens, as well as a host of government conspiracies. Weeks was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1989, and has been in and out of hospitals ever since. For the most part Weeks functions normally, but has occasional psychotic episodes, such as the time he was found standing naked on the interstate, ranting about the "black gashes of cancer" in his car.
On May 16, 1995, he had dinner with his friend, Bill Anderson. Later that night, he found himself in police custody, accused of following Bill into the men's room of the restaurant and shooting him execution style in back of the head. Bill died two days later, and Weeks was charged with murder At his trial, Weeks raised the defense that he was not guilty by reason of insanity, claiming that he did not remember killing Anderson. The jury instead found that Weeks was "guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime." The court imposed the maximum term of sixty years, citing several aggravating factors, yet would not consider his mental illness as a mitigating factor. Weeks appealed both the verdict and the sentence.
Holding: The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the verdict, holding Weeks failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "as a result of his mental disease, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense." The court noted that although Weeks presented ample evidence that he was mentally ill, the evidence was conflicting as to whether he could distinguish right from wrong at the time he shot his friend.
With regard to his sentence, however, the court concluded that the trial court should have considered the mitigating value of Weeks' mental illness in deciding his sentence. The court cited several considerations that bear on whether a mental illness should be a mitigating factor in sentencing. These include: "(1) the extent of the defendant's ability to control his or her behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of the nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of the crime," citing Archer v. State, 689 N.E.2d at 685 (hid. 1997).
The court found that, based on these considerations, Weeks was entitled to a reduction in his sentence. Accordingly, the court reduced the sentence from sixty years to the presumptive term of fifty years.
| Ralph Slovenko Professor of Law and Psychiatry Wayne State University |
Professor Slovenko, Ph.D. comments: Just what is the legal significance of a verdict of "Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI)"? Is it similar to the concept of diminished capacity, entitling the defendant to lower sentence considerations?
Under GBMI law, whenever a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), the jury may return an alternate verdict of GBMI if it finds that the mental illness of the defendant is not sufficient to prove that he was legally insane. Proponents of the law say this new kind of verdict gives the jury the opportunity of agreeing that the defendant is mentally ill, yet holding him criminally responsible.
The GBMI provision was clearly designed to avoid the all-or-nothing result of an NGRI verdict, and in some respects, is a disguised abolition of NGRI. While it appears to be an alternative to a straight guilty verdict, a defendant found GBMI would be incarcerated just as if he were found guilty. The defendant under GBMI is handled just like any other convicted person. He will get special treatment if he needs it, but no different from that available for and needed by any prisoner.
As a result, in states with a GBMI verdict, defense lawyers tend to recommend a straight not-guilty plea rather than NGRI. With a not-guilty plea, a defendant has a chance of being fully acquitted and set free. By entering an NGRI plea, however, he opens himself up to a second possibility of conviction. Juries may believe that GBMI is a compromise or middle ground. Indeed, the phrase has an exculpatory ring to it—"guilty but mentally ill." In reality, however, the provision is another opportunity to find a mentally ill defendant guilty.
The legal relevance of a verdict of GBMI is unclear, but the effect of such a finding may be similar to a finding of diminished capacity. Moreover, diminished capacity applies only in specific intent crimes such as murder and assault; see United States v. Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 1998) (bank robbery was deemed a general intent crime, so evidence of diminished capacity was not allowed). Consequently, in crimes of general intent a defendant who enters a plea of NGRI has the opportunity to offer evidence of mental illness on the issue of his capacity. While this evidence may not be sufficient to exculpate him, he may be entitled to lower sentence considerations. As the court in State v. Weeks held, the defendant's mental illness may be considered a mitigating factor in determining sentencing, possibly offsetting certain aggravating factors of the crime. Under these guidelines, a defendant may receive more than lip-service acknowledgment of a serious, if not exculpatory, mental illness than a verdict of GBMI seems to provide.
