Albert Bartlett's saga began when he parked his pickup truck in front of the courthouse. While he was inside pleading guilty to a drunk driving charge, two teenagers stole a duffel bag allegedly containing marijuana out of his truck. The thieves were captured and the trail led back to Mr. Bartlett. He was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to sell and was offered the representation of public counsel. Before his case was finished, Mr. Bartlett would retain and discharge every public defender in the county. He told the court he had strategic differences of opinion with the attorneys regarding his theory of conspiracy and with the calling of witnesses.
The court allowed him to represent himself but appointed standby counsel to assist him when necessary. Deidre Caughlan, of Butte, Montana got the job. She recalled Mr. Bartlett as a person whose perception of reality was distorted. Prior to her discovery of a previous psychiatric report diagnosing him with Schizophrenia, she asked the court to perform a competency evaluation. In an odd mixture of bedfellows, Mr. Bartlett and the prosecutor both opposed the motion. Mr. Bartlett felt he did not need a competency evaluation, and the state argued that granting the request would allow him to manipulate the system. The court denied the standby counsel's motion. Mr. Bartlett proceeded to trial and was convicted.
The court's obligation to protect the rights of the defendant superceded his objections to the evaluation.
Attorney Caughlan appealed on his behalf, arguing that the trial judge erred by not ordering the competency evaluation. The appeals court agreed, holding that the court's obligation to protect the rights of the defendant superceded Mr. Bartlett's objections to the evaluation. The case was remanded.
The trial judge now ordered Mr. Bartlett to a local hospital for the evaluation process. While there, he refused to participate in the testing. His evaluator, aware of Mr. Bartlett's previous diagnosis of Schizophrenia, nevertheless concluded that his unwillingness to participate was not the result of a mental disease or defect. At the subsequent hearing, the defendant told the court that he consciously chose not to participate in the evaluation. The court gave him three days to decide if he was willing to undergo testing or be declared competent to stand trial. Prosecutor Brad Newman described a courtroom scene that rapidly deteriorated into a perilous situation for Attorney Caughlan.
"For the first minute or two, Bartlett was using a conversational tone. He told the judge he was not going along with it (a further evaluation). He blamed Deidre Caughlan for starting this. The judge told him that Ms. Caughlan was there to help him. Bartlett began to pound his fist on the table and there was fire in his eyes. The change caught everyone off guard." Mr. Bartlett lunged at Attorney Caughlan and was restrained by guards. Before being dragged away, he spit at the attorney and shouted "Keep that bitch away from me or I'll break her fucking neck."
Mr. Bartlett proceeded to a second trial without participating in a competency evaluation. The court replaced the standby counsel with a permanent attorney and Mr. Bartlett was described as remaining subdued during the trial. He was convicted again. On appeal, he argued that his failure to cooperate in an evaluation may itself be a symptom of a mental disorder.
Holding: The conviction and sentencing were upheld. The trial judge correctly interpreted Montana law as allowing him to rely upon an evaluator's determination as to whether a refusal to cooperate in the evaluation process was the result of a mental disease or defect. To hold otherwise would result in more defendants refusing to participate in the process, hoping their refusal would be viewed as evidence of insanity. The court further held that Mr. Bartlett's obstreperous conduct in the courtroom did not rise to the level of sufficient doubt as to his competency to stand trial.
 | Michael Welner, M.D. Chairman The Forensic Panel |
Dr. Welner comments: Evaluations of this kind are among the most challenging criminal competency cases. The natural inclination in a forensic hospital is to presume competency after observing an oriented and superficially appropriate defendant. Not so fast. You don't have to wear a bathrobe and stop shaving to warrant a finding of incompetency. How can we sort out the fitness to proceed, or to waive counsel, of the criminal defendant who does not want to cooperate?
I recall a case in which I evaluated a defendant's competency to waive counsel. His communication was fine, his behavior in the interview appropriate, he was conversant with the trial process and court functionaries, and although he planned a peculiar defense, he recognized it as such.
Just a bit too big for his britches, he believed he would advocate his position more forcefully than any assigned counsel. Prepared as I was to find him competent, I was forced to change my opinion upon observing him in court. He absolutely refused to follow instructions from the judge, to the point of completely disrupting the trial process. It was then that his grandiosity manifested and his real lack of internal control. How could I not find him incompetent?
Legal and psychiatric professionals involved with someone such as Mr. Bartlett should garner as much information as possible about what the defendant's own trial strategy is, and what motivates it. The more bizarre the plan, the more likely that the seemingly intact patient has a more serious underlying psychiatric disturbance. There are some people, and Mr. Bartlett may be one, that a clinician cannot help but consider for treatment that would better prepare them for the trial process. Otherwise, the incompetence of the defendant may not actually emerge until faced with the stress of a court appearance.
Some defendants will repeatedly fire counsel and stir up tumult simply to obfuscate the trial process.
And then, the flip side. Some defendants will repeatedly fire counsel and stir up as much tumult simply to the end of obfuscating the trial process. This is sometimes seen in cases where the identification evidence is clear, the defendant faces very serious charges, has little resources to mount a defense, and is immature in his or her coping approach to the impending trial.
This is yet another reason why attorneys whose cases are referred for competency examinations should provide the evaluating mental health professionals with as much data pertinent to the fitness question as possible. Prosecutors seeking to assert a defendant's fitness should do the same. All too often, a passive approach by the attorney or prosecutor leads to a competency finding which is contradicted by certain available information. An ounce of fact is worth a pound of expertise. Pick up the phone now and call the hospital, or don't blame the doctor later.
Maintaining a person under hospital observation is a small sacrifice to make if it enables evaluating staff to assemble a more conclusive database. For the presumptuous competency decision perhaps motivated by the feelings aroused in an examiner who feels rejected by a patient who won't talk, is the enemy of due process.
