A stalking statute that restricts threatening and repeated conduct meets the civil definition of intentional infliction of emotional distress is constitutional. A defendant's ability to move about and associate freely will be restricted. However, such restrictions are justified because the state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from threatening or harmful behavior. The defendant, aged 25, expressed a romantic interest in a 13-year-old girl. She rebuffed his behavior, her parents told the defendant to leave her alone, a private attorney sent a warning letter advising him to refrain from contacting the girl, and a no-contact order was obtained from a federal court. Despite these efforts, the defendant engaged in the following activities during an ensuing six-month period: Attended a community dance where the girl was and publicly professed his love for her; attended her graduation ceremony and told a police officer he was looking for her, parked on her street when she was home; called her on the telephone; appeared at her worksite to warn her that "you better talk to me". The defendant was convicted of stalking. He appealed, arguing the stalking statute was facially vague for failing to define emotional distress, and was overbroad because merely being within the repeated visual proximity of a specific person would criminalize his behavior.

The court rejected his arguments, holding that 1) the civil definition of emotional distress was the applicable standard for the stalking statute and 2) the statute was narrowly drafted to restrict only threatening behavior, with limited infringement on the defendant's rights to free association and movement.