John Doe filed a lawsuit against two priests, alleging that while he served as an altar boy at the Church of St. Matthias in Lanham, Maryland, the priests sexually abused him. He claimed that the abuse began in 1972 when he was 11 years old and continued until 1978. One of the priests was Thomas Schaefer, who served as pastor at St. Matthias from 1972 through 1975, and the other was Alphonsus Smith , who served as pastor there beginning in 1975. The priests allegedly gained Doe's trust by giving him money and gifts, and then repeatedly molested him. In addition, Doe asserted that Schaefer used pornographic material while engaging in the sexual acts, and took pornographic photographs of him.
But John Doe did not file suit against the priests until July, 1995, charging them, among other things, with battery, negligence and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Doe asserted that it wasn't until his marriage “fell apart” in 1994 that he first became aware that he was injured as a result of the priests' actions. He also sued the Archdiocese on various claims of negligence, alleging that the Archdiocese knew in 1967 that Schaefer was a pedophile, and had required him to undergo treatment. Doe didn't learn that fact until 1995, when he confronted the Archdiocese about the priests' conduct.
The applicable statute of limitation period is three years, and the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as time barred. They asserted that based on the discovery rule, which applies in Maryland, the action occurred, and the statute period began to run, on the date when Doe knew, or with due diligence reasonably should have known, of the wrong. The defendants pointed out that Doe conceded that he retained memories of the underlying conduct throughout his adulthood, and that repressed memory was not an issue. According to the defendants, the statute was tolled only until Doe reached adulthood, in 1978, and his right to sue therefore expired some time in 1981. Doe principally contended that the statute didn't begin to run until he realized he had been harmed, and that the priests' conduct was wrongful and actionable, which wasn't until he was 33 years of age. The circuit court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and Doe appealed.
It is unfair to expect . . . victims of childhood abuse to understand [its] impact on their later lives.
Held: Affirmed; Doe's claims were barred by the statute of limitation. Said the Court, the statute begins to run when the potential plaintiff is on “inquiry notice” of such facts and circumstances that would “prompt a reasonable person to inquire further.” The Court found particularly instructive the 1996 case of Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 679 A.2d 1087, where the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that the repressed memory of childhood sexual abuse does not toll the statute of limitation. The court in that case noted that the scientific community has not reached a consensus on the validity of repression theory, and considered the legal impact of giving credence to the repression theory “when there is no way to prevent the possibility of therapist-induced ‘recovered’ memories.” In applying Maskell to the case at hand, the Court noted that the Maskell court had refused to allow an exception that would delay the accrual date of a cause of action for situations in which the victim had no recollection whatsoever of abuse. Therefore, said the Court, it would “decline to fashion a lesser exception for a victim who was aware of the acts but did not appreciate at the time that they were wrong, or did not realize until years later that he was harmed.”
| Stuart Greenberg, Ph.D., ABPP |
Dr. Greenberg comments: In contrast to Maryland, my home state of Washington employs what could be described as a very “plaintiff liberal” maturation of harm rule in that the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers that she/he has been harmed and can reasonably attribute the source or cause of that harm and the nature of its impact. Plaintiffs faced with the Maryland rule may argue that it is unfair to expect the injured and impaired victims of childhood abuse to be able to both understand the sometimes subtle if pervasive impact of abuse on their later lives and to muster the wherewithal to take action against a powerful and frightening offender. It would be, essentially, like punishing them a second time for being victims in that it is the victimization that interferes with their ability to understand that they have been wronged. Defendants may argue the basic unfairness of pressing such “ancient” and “vague” claims in that it is excessively difficult to defend oneself against a charge that something—usually without witnesses—took place decades ago. Further, given the fluidity and suggestibility of human memory, the plaintiff may well have come to genuinely believe that something traumatic happened when in fact it did not happen or did not happen at the hands of that defendant. While it is supposed to be plaintiff's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the elements of the tort action, in fact it is often the defense in these cases that feels the burden of disproving the allegation, since rarely are provable alibis possible after so much time has passed.
