Robert Linskey was a firefighter with a history of substance abuse and depression. He worked for the fourth busiest station in Philadelphia. Every five weeks, he performed rescue squad duty Shortly after beginning work, he responded to a rescue call and found a man who had committed suicide by hanging.
He witnessed many events that were very unusual and very scary.
Mr. Linskey began seeing a psychologist as he continued to work on the rescue squad. Nearly six years later, he requested and was granted a transfer to a slower station. At the new site; he worked the rescue squad every three to four weeks.
Within one year, he was hospitalized because of suicidal tendencies and did not return to work. He filed a claim for workers' compensation, which the Fire Department denied. Before a workers' compensation judge, he continued his argument that his employment as a rescue worker led to his psychological disability. The judge agreed that his injury was work-related and compensable.
The Fire Department appealed, claiming that the worker's compensation judge committed an error of law. Mr. Linskey had not been subjected to abnormal working conditions, argued the employer, and therefore his psychiatric injury was not compensable. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board agreed.
Mr. Linskey appealed his case to a Pennsylvania court. To succeed, he bore the burden of establishing that he had sustained a psychiatric injury that was not merely a subjective reaction to normal working conditions. Abnormal working conditions could be shown by: (1) a sudden change or unusual event in the work place; (2) comparing the conditions with those of fellow employees performing similar duties; or (3) a change in duties coupled with an increase in responsibilities [See Berardelli v. WCAB, 578 A.2d 1016 (1990)].
The former firefighter relied on several arguments to prove that he faced abnormal working conditions: (1) He was hired to be a firefighter and therefore the highly stressful rescue duties were abnormal; (2) His transfer to the slower station required him to work more frequently on a rescue squad with inferior equipment; (3) He witnessed many events that were, according to his witness at trial, "very unusual and very scary. . . ."
Holding: The denial of benefits was affirmed. The Court held that emergency rescue squad duties were considered normal working conditions. Mr. Linskey was not exposed to conditions that were any different from those experienced by his co-workers. Neither was his increased workload following the transfer unusual for the position of firefighter He was not under any more stress than what could be expected for the profession.
PTSD has become the fastest growing disability claim for firefighters and police.
Involuntary Intoxication:
The Brancaccio court relied upon the following definition of involuntary intoxication: a defendant is involuntarily intoxicated when he or she has become intoxicated through the fault of another, by accident, inadvertence, or mistake on his own part, or because of a physiological or psychological condition beyond his control.
| Robert Miller, M.D. Professor of Psychiatry University of Denver |
Dr. Miller comments: Once Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) became an "official" diagnosis in the American Psychiatric Association's DSM in 1980, it began to be a regular attraction in legal proceedings of all types, criminal, civil and administrative. Although that specific diagnosis was not mentioned in the decision, it appears that Linskey might have met Criterion A (The person has been exposed to a traumatic event involving actual or threatened death or serious injury or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others; and the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror.)
The diagnosis was born in wartime, having been initially called "shell shock" and then "battle fatigue." Initial definitions required that the traumatic event be outside usual human experience; but, largely due to pressure from child abuse victim advocates, it has been broadened to include victims of ongoing abuse, which cases such as this one could satisfy.
Workers' compensation was created at a time in which society was willing to create social programs that would facilitate the provisions of "no-fault" support for those disabled on the job, without time-consuming (and expensive) judicial proceedings. As the economy tightened, public and private support for social programs of all kinds decreased significantly including workers' compensation programs.
Courts and legislatures have differed in the rules for psychological disabilities as compared to physical ones. As in this case, many states provide that a claimant must meet a heightened standard for emotional injuries than for physical injuries, "because of the highly subjective nature of psychiatric injuries." Other states (e.g., Colorado) have equal standards for awaiting initial benefits, but place limits on the duration of payments for psychological injuries while not limiting duration of coverage for physical injuries. As with the issue of parity in insurance coverage, there has been a long history of discrimination against persons with mental disorders.
The issue of whether Linskey was in fact disabled seems to have been ignored, because the applicable statute limits recovery to those subjected to "abnormal working conditions" for the job in question. Since the job itself was inherently stressful, and Linskey was subjected to the same conditions as other fire/rescue workers, recovery was barred. Had he received physical injuries, he would presumably have been eligible for benefits, even though the working conditions were not abnormal. Further, had Linskey developed his mental disorder while in military service, where death and dismemberment are certainly not "abnormal working conditions," he would have been eligible for disability.
PTSD has become the fastest growing basis for disability claims for workers in hazardous fields such as police and firefighters [Persanal Communication, Gerald Starkey, Colorado Fire and Police Pension Board, March 21 1992]. Limiting coverage for PTSD clearly saves money for governments and corporations. Fortunately not all courts and legislatures have been this restrictive. In a landmark case, the Michigan Supreme Court held that, for workers' compensation purposes, an employer takes an employee as it finds him; if that employee has a pre-existing vulnerability to "normal working conditions," he may still receive compensation if his condition is triggered by his work. (See Carter v. General Motors, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1961)). Ultimately, the issue boils down to social choice between budget cutting and social support for disabled individuals. Budget cutting wins.
