Jimmy Dell Bowen was in trouble. He was facing charges of first-degree murder and he did not like the attorney assigned to defend him. He filed a motion to allow his lawyer to withdraw, telling the court that he wanted to represent himself.
In support of his request, he cited his high school education, two years of "reading the law," and the fact that he had "run a law library in the Florida State Prison for two years." He had already represented himself in a Driving Under the Influence (DUI) charge and a felony charge. He claimed he knew how to query and select jurors and witnesses, and told the court that he had prevailed in the DUI matter. He did concede, however, that he went to prison on the felony charge. The trial judge commented, "So you obviously lost," to which Mr. Bowen retorted (in reference to his present public defender), "Is Mr. Lopez a guaranteed winner?"
He had "run a law library in the Florida state prison."
The judge was not persuaded. He said "I don't think he's competent, based on his high school diploma, to represent himself in a case of this nature." Mr. Bowen and his attorney proceeded to trial and he was convicted of second-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder and carrying a concealed weapon.
The convicted defendant successfully appealed, convincing the higher court that his right to self-representation had been improperly denied when the trial judge wrongly decided that he could not represent himself because of a lack of legal knowledge, rather than on whether he had simply "knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel." He wrote his own legal brief and convinced the appellate court to reverse his conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida, arguing that a criminal defendant should not be allowed to exercise the right of self-representation without proving the intellectual capability to mount an effective defense. By requiring a minimum level of legal capability, the state argued, "Florida can provide more protection than the United States Constitution for a defendant's right to a fair trial . . . [and] this court will also be safeguarding the State's right to an efficient and unimpeded trial."
Holding: The reversal of the conviction was upheld. The Court concluded that a defendant who knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel has received a fair trial, providing he or she proceeded "with eyes open." Relying on a U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding a defendant's right to self-representation, the Court agreed that "to force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him" [see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51) (1975)]. Mr. Bowen's right to self-representation should not have been denied because he only had a high school diploma.
Editor's Note: Assistant Attorney General Angela McCravy represented the state in the Bowen case. She has authored a guide for trial judges on responding to requests by defendants for self-representation (See Self-Representation and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Fla. B.J, Oct. 1997 at 44).
| Ralph Slovenko Professor of Law and Psychiatry Wayne State University |
Dr. Slovenko comments: Can a court require a defendant to be represented by counsel because of a concern that he or she might be deprived of a fair trial without a lawyer? The Florida Supreme Court answered in the negative. A review of judicial history is in order.
In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time drew a distinction between a defendant's competency to stand trail and his competency to waive counsel and represent himself (see Westbrook v. State of Arizona). It was the unanimous opinion of three examining psychiatrists that the defendant was competent to stand trial. The defendant insisted upon representing himself, and he was convicted of murder with the penalty set at death. On appeal, he argued that he was mentally incompetent to represent himself at trial; that is, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that "Although petitioner received a hearing on the issue of his competence to stand trial, there appears to have been no hearing or inquiry into the issue of his competence to waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel and proceed, as he did, to conduct his own defense. . . . [A] protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused."
In a later decision, the U. S. Supreme Court held that, "As for defendant's competency to waive counsel, the court is of the opinion that one who may be suffering from paranoid delusions should not be entrusted with the sole conduct of his defense." [See Government of Virgin Islands v. Niles]
In 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation [see Faretta v. California]. In most criminal prosecutions, said the Court, the accused could better defend with counsel's guidance than by his own unskilled efforts, but "personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages." Justice Blackman's dissent needled the majority by writing that the Court "now bestows a constitutional right on one to make a fool of himself." He argued that "representation by counsel is essential to ensure a fair trial."
The essence of the ruling in Faretta is the right of autonomy The defendant, not the lawyer, will suffer the consequences of a conviction, and it is the accused's personal right to decide whether counsel is a benefit or a detriment. However, Faretta allows the trial court to appoint standby counsel, even over the objection of the defendant.
The purpose of such counsel is limited: to aid the defendant if and when help is requested, and to take over the case in the event self-representation must be terminated. The right of self-representation is not violated unless standby counsel substantially interferes with "significant tactical decisions" of the defendant, "controls the questioning of witnesses," speaks in defendant's place against his or her wishes on important matters, or in some other way "destroys the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself [see McKaslzle v. Wiggins, 1984)." The Court repeated, as it did in Faretta, that a defendant who exercises his right to appear pro se cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel.
It is within the defendant's rights to sit mute and mount no defense at all.
Once a court determines that a competent defendant of his own free will has knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel, the dictates of Faretta are satisfied and the inquiry is over. It is within the defendants rights, if he or she so chooses, to sit mute and mount no defense at all.
